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JUDICIAL DECISIONS AND LINGUISTIC
ANALYSIS: IS THERE A LINGUIST IN THE
COURT?
LAWRENCE M. SOLAN*
In the background of any discussion about linguistics and law is the
question that Clark Cunningham posed: "Is there really anything in the field
of legal decision making where a linguist has better information than the
judge?"' I wish to address that question briefly here.
First, I will discuss certain limits in the potential relevance of linguistic
theory to legal analysis. In particular, even on its own terms, linguistics
ordinarily will not be a source of authority about how legal documents
should be interpreted. I will then discuss two areas in which I believe that
linguistic analysis may be of some use to courts. The first, which will be
touched on only briefly, involves the discussion by courts of statutes
containing complex syntactic structures whose intepretations are in dispute.
Although linguists ordinarily have no special ability to interpret such
statutes, they may be of help to a court obliged to justify its decision with
an account of how the language should be analyzed. Most of the paper will
be devoted to the second area, which is word meaning. I will show that
courts evaluate the meanings of disputed terms in two different ways-in
terms of definitions and in terms of how far the word strays from the
prototypical use of the word-and that different approaches to word
meaning can have serious jurisprudential ramifications.
THE LIMITED RELEVANCE OF LINGUISTICS TO LAW
The business of judges is to make decisions and to justify them. To the
extent that judges need to interpret statutory or other language in perform-
ing these tasks, they are as able as anyone else to do so without the help
* Partner, Orans, Elsen & Lupert, One Rockefeller Plaza, New York, New York. B.A. Brandeis
University (1974); Ph.D. University of Massachusetts, Amherst (1978); J.D. Harvard Law School
(1982). Portions of this paper were presented at the meetings of the Law and Society Association in
June, 1995. I am grateful to Peter Tiersma, Steven Winter, Marc Poirier, and Clark Cunningham for
their comments and discussion.
1. Clark D. Cunningham, What if the Meaning of Law Was a Matter of Common Sense? A
Thought Experiment (May 17, 1995, on file with the author).
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of a linguist, and linguistic theory tells us that this is so.2 Linguistic
inquiry starts with the proposition that "[a] person who speaks a language
has developed a certain system of knowledge, represented somehow in the
mind and, ultimately, in the brain in some physical configuration."3 The
goals of linguistic research are to come to an understanding of this system
of knowledge and to explain how it arises. That seemingly dissimilar
languages share many common properties in their structure and that
children develop some aspects of the structure of language without much
exposure to them lead linguists to conclude that a good part of this
knowledge results from innate structures that severely limit the kinds of
systems of linguistic knowledge that can develop in humans.
To take one example, when we hear the sentence, "John thought he
should be more polite to Bill," we recognize that he can be construed to
refer to John or to some unnamed individual, but not to Bill. But when we
hear, "he thought John should be more polite to Bill," he can no longer
refer to John, and now must refer to some unnamed male. The rule
controlling the interpretation of these sentences refers to the syntactic
relationship between the position of the pronoun and the position of a
potential antecedent.4 The principle is universal. Languages around the
world obey it, and children learning language rarely make errors with
respect to it, despite the fact that they have received no instruction.
Significantly, the range of available interpretations for these sentences is
independent of context.
It is not unusual for judges to interpret pronouns. We all do it
unselfconsciously and with extraordinary rapidity. But it is unusual for
2. In making this statement, I assume, without argument, that at least part of what a judge must
do is to interpret the text, as a speaker of English, in terms of its syntax and the meaning of its words.
That is, even if we accept the notion that a legal text is subject to a special set of interpretive rules,
judges are well aware of the ordinary meanings of the texts they interpret, and generally recognize these
meanings as a significant factor in the process of statutory or contractual construction. This fact is
recognized in the canon of construction calling for words in statutes to be given their ordinary meanings
unless they are defined otherwise statutorily. See, e.g., Director, Office of Workers' Compensation
Programs v. Greenwich Collieries, 114 S. Ct. 2251, 2255 (1994). For discussion of various notions of
meaning that may be relevant in legal interpretation, see FREDERICK SCHAUER, PLAYING BY THE RULES
(1991).
3. NOAM CHOMSKY, LANGUAGE AND PROBLEMS OF KNOWLEDGE: THE MANAGUA LECTURES 3
(1988).
4. The operating principle is called "c-command." Basically, a pronoun may not be in a
syntactically higher position in a sentence than its antecedent. See NOAM CHOMsKY, LECTURES ON
GOVERNMENT AND BINDING (1981) for detailed discussion. For a non-technical introduction to these
issues, see LAWRENCE M. Sor.AN, THE LANGUAGE OF JUDGES (1993).
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judges to have to theorize about how they interpret pronouns. Thus, we
would not ordinarily expect judges to have to rely on linguists when they
are called to construe a statute containing a pronoun. The same holds true
for a myriad of syntactic and interpretive principles studied by linguists.
Those aspects of knowledge of language not predetermined by the kinds
of innate structures described above are learned as language-specific facts.
A language's vocabulary is the most obvious example. In this domain,
people raised in the same linguistic community, i.e., people who acquire the
same language, appear to have developed similar, if not identical, systems
of linguistic knowledge.' We would not expect linguists to stand in a
privileged position when it comes to interpreting even these aspects of
language, and they do not. As a result of having studied the matter,
linguists may be able to bring to the attention of others interpretations of
which the linguist is aware. But they cannot and do not dictate to a
community how language is to be understood.6 Linguistics is a descriptive,
and to the extent it is successful, an explanatory endeavor. It does not
prescribe. Judges who are suspicious of allowing linguists to testify about
the meanings of words in an effort to add weight to the position of one of
the litigants are, in my opinion, generally on the right track.7
LINGUISTICS IN THE COURTS
There are, however, occasions on which judges do theorize about the
structure of language. This occurs most often when a dispute requires the
court to accept one proffered interpretation and to reject another, and the
court feels obliged to explain why it has taken the position it has. When
this happens, linguistic analysis may be of some help to judges, who are
likely to be far better at interpreting language than they are at talking about
why it is that they interpret language the way they do.' I will focus here
on two circumstances in which I believe this to be true.
5. See NOAM CHOMSKY, LANGUAGE AND THOUGHT (1993).
6. For two excellent non-technical books that elaborate on these points, see RAY JACKENDOFF,
PATTERNS IN THE MIND (1994); STEVEN PINKER, THE LANGUAGE INSTINCT (1994).
7, There are significant exceptions such as the research on comprehensiblity ofjury instructions
that Judy Levi reported at the conference survey work in trademark cases about usage. Law and
Linguistics Conference, 73 WASH. U. L.Q. 800, 957-58 (1995).
8. See STANLEY FISH, DENNIS MARTINEZ AND THE USES OF THEORY, in DOING WHAT COMES
NATURALLY 372 (1989).
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A. When the Statute is Hard to Read
First, when the language in question, often in a statute or contract, is
especially convoluted, there is heightened potential for courts to write
confused opinions about language. At the same time, there is heightened
opportunity for judges to take advantage of the inelegant language to write
an opinion which, on analysis, is not in keeping with the language at all.9
In either case, such judicial argumentation leads to a jurisprudence that
obfuscates. Making matters worse, stare decisis operates to propagate faulty
linguistic analysis. To avoid unwanted results, a court in Case 2 sometimes
walks away from the kind of analysis that it only recently espoused in Case
1.10
In these cases, courts no doubt can use assistance in deciding how to
express their analysis of the language in question. The Supreme Court's
citation to the Cunningham et al. review of The Language of Judges
demonstrates the point." The X-Citement Video case, 2 in which the
Court recently had to discuss the scope of "knowingly" in a virtually
incomprehensible statute, 3 also strikes me as an instance in which
linguistic analysis could have a clarifying effect.
B. Concepts and Categories
There is a second, far more pervasive area in which linguistics may play
a role in the judicial system. One of the most frequent issues facing courts
is the goodness of fit between a particular event that occurred in the world
9. See Richard J. Pierce, The Supreme Court's New Hypertextualism: An Invitation to Cacophony
and Incoherence in the Administrative State, 95 COLUM. L. REv. 749 (1995); SOLAN, supra note 4,
especially Chapters 2-4.
10. Compare, e.g., United States v. Yermian, 468 U.S. 63 (1984), with Liparota v. United States,
471 U.S. 419 (1985) (taking different positions concerning the scope of knowingly in syntactically
similar statutes).
11. Clark D. Cunningham et al., Plain Meaning and Hard Cases, 103 YALE L.J. 1561 (1994),
cited by the Supreme Court in United States v. Granderson, 114 S. Ct. 1259, 1267 (1994); United States
v. Staples, 114 S. Ct. 1793, 1806 (1994) (Ginsburg, J. concurring); Director, Office of Workers'
Compensation Programs v. Greenwich Collieries, 114 S. Ct. 2251, 2255 (1994).
12. United States v. X-Citement Video, Inc., 115 S. Ct. 464 (1994).
13. 18 U.S.C. § 2252 (1994). The statute punishes "any person who knowingly transports or ships
in interstate or foreign commerce ... any visual depiction if-(A) the producing of such visual
depiction involves the use of a minor engaging in sexually explicit conduct; and (B) such visual
depiction is of such conduct;" The issue in X-Citement ideo, Inc., 115 S. Ct. 464, was whether the
statute was constitutionally infirm for failing to require that the defendant knows that the producing of
the visual depiction involved the use of a minor engaging in sexually explicit conduct.
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and a legally relevant concept. Either a single fraud followed by a lengthy
cover-up constitutes a "pattern of racketeering activity" under RICO, or it
does not. 4 Either an accounting firm that helped prepare documents for
a public offering of stock is a "seller" of those securities under Section
12(2) of the Securities Act of 1933, or it is not. 5 In legal decision
making, there is generally no middle ground. As Steven Winter observes,
the law of the excluded middle, "A or not A," is deeply entrenched in our
system.1
6
Conceptualization, as a cognitive process, does not work this way,
however. For most words, there is no definition that contains the complete
set of necessary and sufficient conditions for membership in the conceptual
class that the word expresses. If we try to form tight definitions of a
concept that will cover all and only the desired results, we will fail. Any
reader who tries right now to define "chair" to include all and only chairs
will quickly get the point. 7 Rather, work in linguistics and cognitive
psychology shows that we form concepts, at least in part, by absorbing
prototypes, and that concepts become indeterminate at the margins.'" As
events and things become more remote from the prototype, they more
closely fit into other categories. By elongating our chair, for example, we
at some point will create a love seat and then a sofa. In addition, it is
generally the case that a given event or thing can be a member of many
14. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961, 1962 (1988 and Supp. 1994). See Midwest Grinding Co., Inc. v. Spitz, 976
F.2d 1016 (7th Cir. 1992). In Midwest Grinding, the Court found the plaintiff's allegations of a single
fraud followed by subsequent active concealment (perjury or obstruction of justice) did not fit the
required pattern. Id. at 1024. Instead, the Court found the claim to be an attempt to "fit a square peg
in a round hole." Id. at 1025.
15. See Pinter v. Dahl, 486 U.S. 622 (1988).
16. See Steven L. Winter, Transcendental Nonsense, Metaphoric Reasoning, and the Cognitive
Stakes for Law, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 1105 (1989).
17. For discussion of problems with definitions, see, e.g., J.A. Fodor et al., Against Definitions,
8 COGNITION 263 (1980); Roy Sorensen, Vagueness and the Desiderata for Definition, in DEFINITIONS
AND DEFINABILITY: PHILOSOPHICAL PERSPECTIVES 71 (James H. Fetzer et al. eds., 1991), and references
cited therein.
18. For a summary of these issues, including references to the underlying literature, see FRANK
C. KEIL, CONCEPTS, KINDS, AND COGNITIVE DEVELOPMENT (1989); RAY JACKENDOFF, SEMANTICS AND
COGNITION (1983). For an example of prototype analysis in the linguistic literature, see Linda Colemen
& Paul Kay, Prototype Semantics: The English Word Lie, 57 LANGUAGE 26 (1981). Some researchers
have concluded rather convincingly that knowledge of words includes some theory about the word's
features as well as prototype analysis. See, e.g., Douglas L. Medin & Edward J. Shoben, Context and
Structure in Conceptual Combination, 20 COGNITIVE PSYCHOLOGY 158 (1988). See also Winter, supra
note 16 (relying heavily on the work of George Lakoff and Mark Johnson concerning concepts and
categorization). See also GEORGE LAKOFF, WOMEN, FIRE, AND DANGEROUS THINGS: WHAT
CATEGORIES REVEAL ABOUT THE MIND (1987).
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different categories (e.g., furniture, wooden object, etc.), and people have
preferences as to the type of category in which they are most likely to
place it. These preferences are in part universal and in part idiosyncratic.
As a result of these aspects of our cognition, we regularly experience
instances in which we simply cannot tell whether a thing or an event is a
member of a particular class or not. For example, in a well-known
experiment,19 subjects were shown pictures of five differently-shaped
vessels and were asked to categorize them as a vase, a cup or a bowl. Some
of the pictures were easily identified. But others, the "in-between" shapes,
were not, and the subjects experienced uncertainty and disagreement with
one another. There is no reason to believe that legally relevant concepts are
any different from other concepts in this respect, and in fact, they are not.
Legal concepts are hard to define and become indeterminate at the margins
just like any other concept. Neither appointment to the bench nor election
to the legislature vests individuals with special cognitive capacities.
Many of what we consider to be hard cases result from the requirement
that we make a final determination about the relationship between an event
and a concept that we most naturally regard as indeterminate. It is
frequently the system's insistence that we not acknowledge this indetermi-
nacy at the margins, but instead make a decision, that causes hard cases to
be hard. What makes easy cases easy, in contrast, is the proximity of their
events to the prototypes that motivated the legally relevant concepts in the
first place. As hard as some RICO cases are, it is not difficult to conclude
that an individual who has been engaged in one bribery scheme after
another over a period of years, and has invested the proceeds to run a
business, has engaged in a "pattern of racketeering activity," as the statute
requires."0 The decision making process is good at handling easy,
prototypical cases and strains when handling hard cases. Advances in
linguistics and cognitive psychology can help to explain why this is so and
to make judges more aware of certain choices that they necessarily make
in confronting problems of word meaning.
To illustrate the tension between the definitional and prototypical views
of word meaning in the judicial setting, let us examine several Supreme
Court cases in which the issue arises. Smith v. United States2 is a
19. See William Labov, The Boundaries of Words and their Meanings, in NEW VAYS OF
ANALYZING VARIATION IN ENGLISH (Charles J.N. Bailey & Roger W. Shuy eds., 1973).
20. See United States v. Biaggi, 909 F.2d 662, 685-87 (2d Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 499 U.S. 904
(1991).
21. 113 S. Ct. 2050 (1993).
[VOL. 73:1069
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statutory construction case in which the majority looked to the definition
of a concept while the dissent attempted to use a prototype analysis. In
Smith, the defendant had attended a meeting with people who turned out
to be government agents and informants, in which he agreed to trade an
automatic weapon for some cocaine. He got cold feet and fled, but was
apprehended after a high-speed chase. He was indicted and convicted of
conspiracy to possess cocaine with intent to distribute and attempt to
possess cocaine with intent to distribute, both inchoate drug trafficking
crimes."2 Section 924(c)(1) of the Criminal Code provides:
Whoever, during and in relation to any crime of violence or drug trafficking
crime ... uses or carries a firearm, shall, in addition to the punishment
provided for such crime ... be sentenced to imprisonment for five years, and
if the firearm is a machinegun.... to imprisonment for thirty years.'
Smith was sentenced to the thirty-year statutory penalty. The issue on
appeal was whether his aborted efforts to trade a machinegun for cocaine
constituted use of a firearm during and in relation to a drug trafficking
crime.
Writing for the majority, Justice O'Connor went to the dictionary, which
interpreted "use" very broadly to mean, "'[tlo convert to one's service' or
'to employ."' 24 O'Connor reasoned that trading a machinegun to commit
a drug trafficking crime is an instance of employing the machinegun to
commit such a crime. The activity thus fits within the definition of the
word "use," and the conviction should be affirmed.
Justice Scalia, writing in dissent on behalf of himself and two others,
replied:
To use an instrumentality ordinarily means to use it for its intended purpose.
When someone asks "Do you use a cane?" he is not inquiring whether you
have your grandfather's silver-handled walking-stick on display in the hall;
he wants to know whether you walk with a cane. Similarly, to speak of
"using a firearm" is to speak of using it for its distinctive purpose, i.e., as a
weapon. To be sure, "one can use a firearm in a number of ways," including
22. Id. at 2053 (construing 18 U.S.C. §§ 2, 841(a)(1) & 846 (1988 & Supp. 1993)).
23. 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1) (1988 & Supp. 1995).
24. 113 S. Ct. at 2054. Justice O'Connor referred both to WEBSTER'S NEW INTERNATIONAL
DICTIONARY OF ENGLISH LANGUAGE 2806 (2d ed. 1949) (quoted in the text) and to BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 1541 (6th ed. 1990), which offered a similar definition. Id. For a recent discussion about
the tendency of courts to rely on dictionaries, see Note, Looking it Up: Dictionaries and Statutory
Interpretation, 107 HARV. L. REV. 1437 (1994); Lawrence Solan, When Judges Use the Dictionary, 68
AMERICAN SPEECH 50 (1993).
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as an article of exchange, just as one can "use" a cane as a hall decora-
tion-but that is not the ordinary meaning of "using" the one or the other.
The Court does not appear to grasp the distinction between how a word can
be used and how it ordinarily is used.'
Relying on the canon of construction that words in a statute are to be given
their ordinary meaning, Scalia's point is not that the attempted swap cannot
fit within the definition of "use a firearm," but rather that Smith's actions
are such a peculiar example of that concept that they have strayed too far
from the prototypical case to be considered legitimately within the
"ordinary meaning" of the statute.
O'Connor and Scalia each applied her/his analysis reasonably. That is,
swapping a machinegun for drugs really is a "use" of a machinegun, but
it is a very peculiar one, in all likelihood remote from the core concept that
motivated Congress to enact the statute and the President to sign it. The
issue, then, is not which analysis is performed more competently, but which
kind of analysis courts should use.
The choice between these two views of what it means for an event to fit
within a legally-relevant concept has signficant consequences. Typically,
but not always,26 the definitional approach will lead to broad interpretation
and the prototypical approach will lead to narrower interpretation. While
the definitional approach asks whether an event whose legal status is in
dispute can be construed as coming within the outer boundaries of a
concept, the prototypical approach asks whether it should be construed as
coming within the boundaries of a concept given the remoteness of the
event from the core, or prototype of the concept. Definitions work from the
outside and move inward, and prototypes work from the inside and move
outward.
The prototype approach, in addition to being more consistent with the
way in which we actually understand the meanings of words, incorporates
into judicial inquiry questions that the definitional approach excludes. For
example, in identifying the prototype and deciding how far from it the
court may travel, a court ipso facto comes to an understanding of what
conduct is at the core of the statute in the first place. Thus, the prototype
25. 113 S. Ct. at 2061 (citation omitted).
26. See infra notes 33-37 and accompanying text (discussing MCI Telecommunications Corp. v.
American Telephone and Telegraph Co., 114 S. Ct. 2223 (1994)). Even in Smith, the prototypical
analysis does not logically require the result that Scalia proposed in his dissent. One may conclude that
trading a machine gun for cocaine does come close enough to the core of using a firearm. Thus, the
choice of analysis is not entirely result-oriented.
(VOL. 73:1069
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approach, while textual in nature, necessarily requires inquiry into
normative issues that textualism purports to eschew.27
The discussion in Smith made explicit a debate that had occurred several
years earlier in Schmuck v. United States.2 The defendant in Schmuck was
in the business of setting back odometers in cars, and then selling them to
dealers in Wisconsin. The dealers would then resell the cars to their retail
customers. Once a car was resold, the dealer would, on behalf of his
customer, mail a title registration form to the Wisconsin Department of
Transportation. The issue in Schmuck was whether this mailing was "for the
purpose of executing [the] scheme or artifice," as required by the federal
mail fraud statute.2
9
Writing for a majority of five, Justice Blackmun wrote that "a rational
jury" could have concluded that Schmuck caused the mailing by the dealers
to occur for the purpose of executing the scheme. The jury could have
concluded that "the success of Schmuck's venture depended upon his
continued harmonious relations with, and good reputation among, retail
dealers, which in turn required the smooth flow of cars from the dealers to
their Wisconsin customers."3
Justice Scalia dissented: "In other words, it is mail fraud, not mail and
fraud, that incurs liablity. This federal statute is not violated by a fraudulent
scheme in which, at some point, a mailing happens to occur-nor even by
one in which a mailing predictably and necessarily occurs. The mailing
must be in furtherance of the fraud."'" Relying on earlier cases, Scalia
concluded that the relationship between the fraud and the mailing in
Schmuck was too attenuated to constitute mail fraud.
Perhaps the most radical aspect of Schmuck is its letting the jury decide
whether the mailing was for the purpose of executing a fraud. Traditionally,
it has always been within the domain of the court to determine whether a
27. For a discussion of textualism and its alternatives, see WILLIAM ESKRIDGE, DYNAMIC
STATUTORY INTERPRETATION (1994); Pierce, supra note 9. See also Law and Linguistics Conference,
73 WASH. U. L.Q. 800, 940-53 (1995) (discussing the notion of dynamic statutory interpretation). Even
using prototype analysis instead of definitional analysis, a court limiting itself to the words of a statute
would be precluded from considering all the information a dynamic model would make available.
28 489 U.S. 705 (1989).
29. The statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (1995) reads in relevant part:
Whoever, having devised or intending to devise any scheme or artifice to defraud ... for the
purpose of executing such scheme or artifice or attempting so to do... knowingly causes to
be delivered by mail or such carrier according to the direction thereon .... any such matter
or thing, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than five years, or both.
30. 489 U.S. at 711-12.
3 1. Id. at 723.
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particular set of facts violates a criminal statute.3" In Shmuck, however,
the majority could not conclude that the conduct was criminal even using
the definitional approach. To preserve the conviction, it reduced the
standard to whether a "reasonable jury" could so conclude. If this holding
were to be followed, and jurors were asked to interpret statutes as well as
to find facts, it would lead to enormously complicated questions about how
jurors define the statutes that they are then asked to apply to the facts that
they find.
Justice Scalia appears to be the driving force both behind textualism
generally, and prototype analysis specifically. Yet, neither he nor the other
justices on the Supreme Court are consistent in which type of analysis they
select. For example, in MCI Telecommunications Corp. v. American
Telephone and Telegraph Co.,3 the Court had to interpret two conflicting
provisions of the Communications Act. Section 203(a) requires that
"[e]very common carrier ... file with the Commission ... schedules
showing all charges . . . . Section 203(b)(2) states: "The Commission
may, in its discretion and for good cause shown, modify any requirement
made by or under the authority of this section . .. "" At issue in MCI
was whether the power to "modify" under Section 203(b)(2) gave the
Federal Communications Commission authority to eliminate the filing
requirement of Section 203(a) for nondominant carriers.
Under the Chevron36 doctrine, the Court must give deference to the
statutory interpretation of agencies unless the statutory language unambigu-
ously prohibits such interpretation. The FCC had determined that the statute
gave it the authority to "modify" the filing requirements by waiving them
for certain carriers. A finding of statutory ambiguity would lead to
acceptance of the Commission's position that its power to modify included
the power to eliminate the requirement under certain circumstances.
The Court found the statute unambiguous, and therefore overturned the
agency's interpretation. Writing for the majority, Justice Scalia cited a host
of dictionaries whose definitions of modify focus on limitations on the
amount of permissible change denoted by that concept. The majority
32. "It is this Court's responsibility to say what a statute means, and once the Court has spoken,
it is the duty of other courts to respect that understanding of the governing rule of law." Rivers v.
Roadway Express, Inc., 114 S. Ct. 1510, 1519 (1994).
33. 114 S. Ct. 2223 (1994).
34. 47 U.S.C. § 203(a) (1988).
35. 47 U.S.C. § 203(b)(2) (1988).
36. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
[VOL. 73:1069
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rejected the "peculiar Webster's Third definition"3 7 that failed to focus on
these limitations, but focused rather on the notion of change itself.
I expect that most speakers would agree that calling the elimination of
the filing requirement for small carriers a "modification" of the filing
requirement rather stretches the concept, but that it is not unambiguously
beyond its reaches. Under a prototype analysis, it becomes possible to
debate the point. But the Chevron doctrine makes such debate impermissi-
ble, for any recognition of indeterminacy answers the question before the
argument even begins. As Richard Pierce points out,38 the Court has
forced itself to find clear language in this realm of decision making in
many cases in which the language is plainly vague or ambiguous. Thus, in
cases such as MCI, in which the Court strikes down agency action, the
prototype analysis disappears.
SOME IMPLICATIONS
Courts have survived for a long time, and will continue to survive,
without linguists playing a large role. Nonetheless, it would benefit the
system if judges were to become more conscious of the ramifications of the
arguments that they make concerning the interpretation of language, and if
legislators were to become more conscious of the range of possible
interpretations that will later face the courts.
I have focused here principally on problems with word meaning that
arise from the need to adjudicate disputes whose events stray from the core
of a concept, but do not necessarily fall completely outside the concept.
Because the prototype approach to word meaning more closely approxi-
mates our actual knowledge of words, and because it ordinarily permits
acknowledgement of gradations of meaning that we all, including judges,
experience, I believe that courts should more consciously examine disputed
terms in this way.
The choice has significant ramifications. With respect to criminal
statutes, courts must decide whether or not the events constitute a crime.
Consistent with the prototype approach to meaning, courts would do well
to apply the rule of lenity, thereby ruling in the defendant's favor, as the
events stray further from the core of the concept. Of course, there is no
way to state with any precision when this should occur, but that is a
function of our cognitive limitations, with which we must all live.
37, 114 S. Ct. at 2230.
38. See Pierce, supra note 9, at 754-56.
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Issues concerning the match between events and the language of a
statute, a contract or a common law doctrine arise in civil cases as well.
The driving desire of most litigants to settle lawsuits to avoid the all-or-
nothing result of a litigation is often the consequence of the legal-
conceptual system as it now exists, in which complex events are couched
in zero-sum terms. While the resolution of disputes without resort to the
entire litigation process is obviously a positive consequence, any system of
justice that promotes fair settlements outside the system by threatening
disproportionate results inside the system should be closely examined.
Interestingly, consistent with the prototype approach to conceptualization,
many doctrines involved in civil litigation acknowledge that events do not
always fit neatly into legally-relevant categories. Among these are
comparative negligence, causation of damages, equitable distribution, joint
custody, and the broad discretion that courts have in granting injunctive
relief, all of which permit gradations of award to the winning party. Such
doctrines recognize that the world does not divide up into "A or not A,"
but also contains one situation after another in which "sort of A" is more
the case.39 Advances in linguistics and cognitive psychology show how
this is so. Awareness by judges and legislators of these advances clearly
cannot hurt, and can potentially lead to better reasoned decisions.
39. See Winter, supra note 16.
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